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DIGNITY AND DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYMENT CIVIL 
RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE AND IN COURTS
LAURA BETH NIELSEN*
ELLEN C. BERREY**
ROBERT L. NELSON***
I. INTRODUCTION1
Gerry Handley (plaintiff): They would like always bring up these ra-
cial conversations and make these racial jokes . . . I’d just ignore them. I 
wouldn’t laugh or I wouldn’t listen in . . . . They started talking about in-
cest, and they started talking about blacks from slavery time, you know, 
they bred them and sold them, and they inbred them down in the south. 
And I’m from down south . . . they told me a lot of the blacks had sex with 
their daughters and stuff like that, way back from the Caribbeans [sic]. And 
I would just sit there listening like, “Oh my God, I know they’re not saying 
this.” And the guy asked me, he said, ‘did I ever have sex with my daugh-
ter.’ And so—
Laura Beth Nielsen: He asked you if you had sex with your daughter?
Handley: Yeah.
Nielsen: And this is your boss or your manager?
Handley: He was like my lead.2
When ordinary employees, like Gerry Handley (“P14”) quoted here, 
face what they perceive to be discrimination in the workplace, state and 
federal law may provide redress and restitution.3 As the remedy for em-
* Professor of sociology and the director of legal studies at Northwestern University and a research 
professor at the American Bar Foundation.
** Assistant professor of sociology at the University of Toronto and an affiliated scholar of the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation.
*** Robert and Connie MacCrate Chair in Research on the Legal Profession at the American Bar 
Foundation and a professor of sociology and law at Northwestern University.
1. This article revisits data from our book. See generally ELLEN BERREY, ROBERT L. NELSON &
LAURA BETH NIELSEN, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES 
INEQUALITY (2017). In that book, we use a different theoretical framework but the concept of employ-
ment civil rights as a dignity taking was too interesting to pass up. Id. 
2. Rights on Trial Audio Recordings (selections): Chapter 1, Gerry Handley’s Story, ELLEN 
BERREY, SOCIOLOGIST, https://www.ellenberrey.com/audio [https://perma.cc/D238-LJJT] [hereinafter 
Gerry Handley’s Story].
3. All names of research participants are pseudonyms.
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ployment discrimination suggests (past and future earnings), discrimination 
is a material deprivation of wages. When one experiences discrimination 
and one’s work is devalued or terminated, there are material consequences. 
By definition, it is an illegitimate deprivation of property. Discrimination in 
the workplace, as well as in the process of pursuing claims in regulatory 
agencies and federal courts, routinely involves the re-inscription of mis-
treatment and stereotypes that are, in effect, infantilizing and dehumaniz-
ing, such as the assertion by Mr. Hanley’s supervisor that Mr. Handley and 
other African-American descendants of slaves are hypersexualized preda-
tors.
The invitation of this conference is to examine employment civil 
rights in a “dignity takings” theoretic framework. In some respects, the 
process of using the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) and the federal courts to enforce an employment civil rights 
claim is easy to conceive as a dignity taking, but in other respects it is more 
difficult. Here, we use the existing scholarship on dignity takings to intro-
duce how the concept could work as an analytic framework; in the next 
section, we use our qualitative data to see if we can meet these required 
elements.
The most fulsome exploration of dignity takings comes from the 
scholar who coined the term and identified the phenomenon. In We Want 
What’s Ours: Learning from South Africa’s Land Restitution Program,4
Bernadette Atuahene established the dual harm of a dignity taking where 
individuals (1) experience the confiscation of property by the state through 
a deprivation that is (2) done in a way that resulted in the dehumanization 
or infantilization of the dispossessed. In cases of dignity takings, the resto-
ration of property is not enough, according to Atuahene. Instead, the reme-
dy must include material compensation and a process that reaffirms the 
harmed parties’ agency and humanity.
This Article proceeds in five sections. Section II provides background 
about the nature and scope of the employment civil rights litigation system, 
as well as an exposition about what constitutes a dignity taking and why 
employment civil rights are ripe for a dignity takings analysis. Section III 
presents our methods and data used to conduct the analysis. In Section IV, 
we use our qualitative data to posit three questions. First, does employment 
4. See generally BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH 
AFRICA’S LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM (2014); Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity 
Restoration: Creating A New Theoretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and 
the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 796 (2016); Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a 
Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2016).
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discrimination and the subsequent process of pursuing a legal claim amount 
to a property loss for the individual? Second, does the discrimination itself 
and the subsequent legal process infantilize the party claiming discrimina-
tion? Third, do aggrieved parties seek some recognition of the dehumaniza-
tion? And finally, does the litigation process provide such a process? 
Section V is the conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Discrimination
Our nation’s sixty-year history of battling employment civil rights vio-
lations represents a significant period of incredible progress on a variety of 
fronts including improvements in race and gender wage equality and signif-
icant changes in attitudes about workplace discrimination. And yet, for 
every dollar earned by full- and part-time white male wage workers in the 
United States in 2015, white women earned eighty-two cents; African-
American men earned seventy-three cents, Hispanic men earned sixty-nine 
cents, African-American Women earned sixty-five cents, and Hispanic 
women, fifty-eight cents.5
Of course, some of this differential is attributable to education, experi-
ence, industry, and occupation. When these factors are taken into account, 
however, only about 8% of the gender wage gap can be explained,6 and
nearly 51% of the race gap is explained.7 Of the unexplained wage gap, 
some part is attributable to discrimination.
But wages are not the only way in which employees may be disadvan-
taged based on their race, sex, age, disability, or other statuses that puts 
them in a class protected by anti-discrimination law. Discrimination in 
hiring, promotion, and termination follow these general trends. Additional-
ly, individuals’ experience and perceptions of discrimination vary widely 
based on their racial identity. When asked, “Were you personally treated 
unfairly in hiring, pay or promotion in the past year because of your race or
5. Eileen Patten, Racial, Gender Wage Gaps Persist in U.S. Despite Some Progress, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR.: FACT TANK (July 1, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/01/racial-
gender-wage-gaps-persist-in-u-s-despite-some-progress/ [https://perma.cc/UE5S-9LBH] (referring to 
median hourly earnings).
6. Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Gender Differences in Pay, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 
2000, at 75, 80.
7. Roland G. Fryer et al., Racial Disparities in Job Finding and Offered Wages, 56 J.L. & ECON.
633 (2013); Eric Grodsky & Devah Pager, The Structure of Disadvantage: Individual and Occupational 
Determinants of the Black–White Wage Gap, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 542. It is important to note that quanti-
tative measures such as industry, occupation, and length of workforce participation are themselves
produced by unequal education and discrimination.
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ethnicity?”, 21% of African-Americans said yes, whereas 16% of Hispanics 
and 4% of whites answered yes.8
B. The Legal Process for Combatting Workplace Discrimination
The number of discrimination cases filed in federal district court grew 
from 336 in 1970, to some 9000 in 1983, and then declined to 7613 in 
1989.9 The early 1990s saw a marked increase in the number of filings, 
more than doubling from under 10,000 in 1991 to 23,735 in 1998. 1998 
was the high water mark for filings, and led to doomsday predictions about 
the growth in employment civil rights claims, similar to the alarms sounded 
about the growth in the total number of civil filings in the early 1980s.10
But the doomsday predictions proved wrong. From 1998 to 2004, filings 
declined by 15% to about 20,000 and went on to dip significantly between 
2004 and 2008 before recovering somewhat to 17,000 in 2011. In 2014, the 
most recent year for which data are available, 13,831 lawsuits were filed.
These data reveal a notable trend in the rise of retaliation charges over 
time. They rose from 15.3% of charges in 1992 to 42.8% by 2014. The 
growth in retaliation charges may reflect the rising proportion of charges 
that involve dismissal, a finding documented by Donohue and Siegelman 
for the 1965–1987 period and in our data for the 1988–2003 period.11 It 
may also reflect an increasing tendency for plaintiffs (and their lawyers) to 
add retaliation as a claim in discrimination disputes. It may reflect more 
retaliatory behavior by employers. Without in-depth analysis of claims over 
time and the employment contexts that produce them, we are left to specu-
late about the reasons for this shift.
When employees believe they have suffered a violation of their em-
ployment civil rights and they have no further remedies for appeal in the 
workplace organization itself, those workers who want to pursue a claim 
must make a charge with the EEOC and/or a Fair Employment Practices 
Agency (FEPA) at the state or local level. Some charging parties receive 
relief through the EEOC or state FEPA conciliation process, making a law-
8. See Patten, supra note 5.
9. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 985 (1991). 
10. See BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 1, at 41.
11. Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of 
Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC. REV. 1133, 1167
(1990); see BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 1, at 41.
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suit unnecessary, but most EEOC complaints do not receive definitive reso-
lution and the agency later provides a right to sue letter.12
The proportion of employees who believe they have been targets of 
discrimination and file claims against their employer is slim. For example, 
in 2016, there were 14,870,000 full-time, year-round African-American 
workers in the United States.13 Using the Pew rate of perceived discrimina-
tion (21% for African Americans), we expect that some 3,122,700 African-
American workers thought they were treated unfairly on the basis of their 
race or ethnicity in that year. And yet, there were only 32,309 race discrim-
ination charges made at the EEOC.14 Assuming an equal number were re-
ported to state Fair Employment Practice Agencies (FEPAs), that means 
roughly 64,618 of the 3.1 million workers reported the unfair treatment 
outside the company. In other words, about 2% of African-American work-
ers who think they were treated unfairly on the basis of their racial status 
made a complaint to any agency designed to protect against this. To be 
sure, this includes unfair treatment that does not rise to the legal definition 
of discrimination, but it also excludes part-time, African-American work-
ers, workers of all other racial groups, assumes that those treated unfairly 
were only treated unfairly once, and it does not include unperceived dis-
crimination. With these caveats, this exercise provides a dramatic demon-
stration of how few complaints enter formal dispute resolution processes 
and while the absolute number of complaints may seem large (in Figure 1), 
this exercise puts those “huge” numbers in perspective vis-à-vis perceived 
discrimination in the workplace.
The ratio of lawsuits to charges (sometimes referred to as the conversion 
rate) fluctuates between 15% and 30% for most years in this series. Begin-
ning in 1994, there were steady increases in the percentage of charges lead-
ing to lawsuits—from 15% in 1993 to 18% in 1994, and almost 30% in the 
years 1996 through 1999, and then receding to an average of roughly 17% 
between 2007 and 2014.
12. Michael A. Szkodinski, An Analysis of the EEOC’s Issuance of Early Right-to-Sue Letters: 
Does it Promote Judicial Efficiency or Encourage Administrative Incompetence?, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
689, 690 (2001).
13. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat08.htm [https://perma.cc/2KWL-6MAW] (last 
modified Feb. 8, 2017).
14. Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2016, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/J4FH-SNG6]. 
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Table 1
On the one hand, employment civil rights litigation consumes a large 
part of the federal docket. On the other hand, we see that—of perceived 
discrimination—this caseload represents a tiny fraction of people who be-
lieve they have been targets of discrimination. And yet, in the arena of 
employment discrimination, this is the process to which aggrieved individ-
uals must appeal, and it is the process that does (or does not) function as 
the “cost” to employers for engaging in or permitting discrimination. We 
expect individuals to file these suits to continue to fight workplace discrim-
ination in society. But, when plaintiffs take on the monumental task of 
enforcing rights, what happens to them? Here we argue that what they ex-
perience may be conceived as a dignity taking.
C. Dignity Takings
It is easy to make the case that racist, sexist, homophobic, and dis-
criminatory practices in the workplace are affronts to dignity. Nobody 
wants to be called a “black bitch,”15 to be accused of incest,16 or simply to 
15. Robert L. Nelson et al., Rights on Trial: Race and Representation in Employment Civil Rights 
Litigation (Sept. 13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
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be told they are lazy or not good at their job. Human dignity, pride of work, 
and basic humanity all are implicated in cases of discrimination that in-
volve these kinds of epithets and insinuations. Workplace discrimination, 
as a legal subject, is ripe for an analysis of dignity taking. In the following 
section, we describe the data we collected and analyzed as part of a larger 
project to answer this question.
III. DATA
The research reported here is part of a large-scale, multi-year, mixed-
method research project about employment civil rights which occurred in 
three phases, and which was designed to reveal the distinct perspectives of 
multiple parties engaged in litigation.17 First, we collected and analyzed a 
national random sample of 1788 employment civil rights cases filed in 
federal court in seven districts between 1988 and 2003, coding for hun-
dreds of factors about the cases. We then analyzed these data quantitatively 
to explore litigations trends and outcomes.18 The quantitative portion of our 
research is an expanded replication of Donohue and Siegelman’s well-
known study of employment civil rights litigation between 1972 and 
1987.19
Using the quantitative findings of the most common types of employ-
ment discrimination (race, sex, age, disability) and the most theoretically 
meaningful case resolutions (dismissal, early settlement, late settlement, 
trial), we created a sixteen-cell grid to capture the possible combinations. 
From each cell, we drew a random subsample of cases from two of the 
districts for in-depth study. By sampling for range,20 we increased the like-
lihood of capturing relevant dynamics in the cases.
We interviewed 100 individuals across these cells: forty-one plaintiffs; 
twenty plaintiffs’ attorneys; twenty defense attorneys representing employ-
ers; and nineteen lawyers serving as outside counsel to employers and hu-
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/nelson_racerepresentation_sept_13_20
11.pdf.
16. Gerry Handley’s Story, supra note 2.
17. For the most fulsome statement of our research, see BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note
1.
18. See generally Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? 
Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post–Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 175 (2010).
19. See generally Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A 
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
165 (1990).
20. See, e.g., Mario L. Small, How Many Cases Do I Need?: On Science and the Logic of Case 
Selection in Field-Based Research, 10 ETHNOGRAPHY 5 (2009).
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man resource directors (“defendant-representatives”). We first interviewed 
plaintiffs; when feasible, we interviewed defendant-representatives and 
lawyers in the same case. When this was not feasible, we selected defend-
ant-representatives and lawyers from other cases in the random subsample. 
This Article focuses only on plaintiffs,21 (although we report the findings of 
defendant-representatives and attorneys on both sides elsewhere) but the 
analysis is enhanced through interviews with plaintiff and defense lawyers. 
Defendant-representatives were employed by a company, non-profit organ-
ization, or government entity as human resource professionals or in-house 
counsels with responsibility for employment law (see Table 1).22 Plaintiff-
employees filed cases against the private companies, non-profit organiza-
tions, or government entities that employed them—although, at the time of 
our interviews, only one plaintiff still worked for the employer.
Our interview protocols consisted of open-ended, semi-structured 
questions about closed legal cases involving the interviewee. The plaintiffs’ 
interviews covered their personal experiences of job discrimination, work-
place dispute resolution, legal authorities, and case resolution. Defendant-
representatives, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and outside defense counsel discussed 
a specific closed case and their organization’s general strategy for manag-
ing discrimination complaints and lawsuits. Each interview lasted about 
one hour, and ended with force-choice demographic and attitudinal ques-
tions. Interview transcripts and notes were coded with NVivo qualitative 
analysis software. The coding scheme was developed inductively—with 
codes identified through data analysis—and deductively—with several 
codes based on secondary literature.23
Following standard practices for qualitative research, the analysis uses 
rich, textured data to identify social mechanisms and general processes.24
Because interviewees were asked to “tell us their story,” the resulting data 
can be viewed as narrative. Our data provide a personal account, a “plot,”25
which—with a beginning, middle, and end—resonates as persuasive with 
many readers. To temper the individualistic tendency common in narrative 
21. Ellen Berrey et al., Situated Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Fairness and Inequality in 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1 (2012).
22. Title VII exempts employers with fewer than fifteen employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) 
(The term “employer” signifies those with “fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.”).
23. See generally MATTHEW B. MILE & MICHAEL A. HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA 
ANALYSIS: AN EXPANDED SOURCEBOOK (3d ed. 1994).
24. For an example of this practice, see JOHN LOFLAND & LYN H. LOFLAND, ANALYZING SOCIAL 
SETTINGS: A GUIDE TO QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (3d ed. 1995).
25. See, e.g., FRANCESCA POLLETTA, IT WAS LIKE A FEVER: STORYTELLING IN PROTEST AND 
POLITICS (2006).
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studies,26 we follow socio-legal research that ties narrative accounts to 
social structure, the life course, social situations, and membership in identi-
ty groups.27 Our study combines the persuasive richness of narrative inter-
views with rigorous qualitative analysis of our respondents’ stories.
Our interviewees’ “plots” are necessarily retrospective, particularly 
for the plaintiffs, as very few were still involved in litigation when inter-
viewed. Nonetheless, interviewees’ reconstructions of their cases are as 
important, arguably more important, than their in situ experience. It is 
through memories of salient events that legal actors continually reconstruct 
their faith, or lack thereof, in the fairness and legitimacy of the law. Our 
unique inclusion of defendant-representatives and plaintiffs, along with our 
data on parties’ interpretations of real lawsuits, reveals the subjective and 
relational experiences that matter for both sides’ assessments of fairness.
IV. ANALYSIS
This section of the article uses our original empirical data to analyze 
the four questions alluded to in the introduction and explained in the prior 
section of this paper. This analysis proceeds by answering four questions in 
turn:
A. Does employment discrimination and the process of pursuing 
the legal claim amount to a deprivation of property for the in-
dividual?
B. Does the discrimination itself and the subsequent legal pro-
cess infantilize the party claiming discrimination?
C. Do aggrieved parties seek some recognition of the loss of this 
humanity?
D. Does the litigation process provide such a process?
We argue that the answer to each of the four questions is yes or argua-
bly yes; therefore, the dignity taking theoretic framework is an appropriate 
26. See, e.g., Ellen Berrey & Laura Beth Nielsen, Rights of Inclusion: Integrating Identity at the 
Bottom of the Dispute Pyramid, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 233 (2007); BENJAMIN D. FLEURY-STEINER,
JURORS’ STORIES OF DEATH: HOW AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY INVESTS IN INEQUALITY (2004); Laura 
Beth Nielsen, The Work of Rights and the Work Rights Do: A Critical Empirical Approach, in THE
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 63 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004)
27. See, e.g., DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND 
IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003); Laura Beth Nielsen, Situat-
ing Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law and Street Har-
assment, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1055 (2000); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON 
PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
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way to understand employment civil rights. One story presented here is 
worth telling in its entirety before we move to each of the elements.
Kristen Baker (“P34”), was a thirty-three-year-old, white woman who 
worked as an assistant buyer for GCo, a small, family owned company 
manufacturer. According to her account and records we reviewed, she was 
a hard worker, taking classes to earn certificates in areas of expertise rele-
vant to her job. After five years of service, Daniel Miller, a male employee 
who had not taken the courses and who had only six more months of ser-
vice, was promoted to salesman. Ms. Baker approached the vice president 
to ask about the decision. He told her “Daniel is a guy and he’s got three 
kids and a wife, and you are a girl and you married a doctor, so you obvi-
ously don’t need the income.” Although she thought this was not fair, she 
made the best decision for her and her family, which was to continue work-
ing at the manufacturing plant.
As time went on—according to Ms. Baker—the workplace became 
increasingly professionalized when GCo was sold to a larger company. 
Ironically, the more formalized HR practices coincided with an increase in 
unprofessional behavior. The norms that were carefully policed when the 
company was family-run were harder to enforce in the new bureaucratic 
structure. Soon, the salesmen—and Mr. Miller in particular—were swear-
ing more. And it was not just about venting frustration; what once could be 
explained away as rude or bawdy became obscene. Ms. Baker came to 
believe that the sexualized teasing was ruining her credibility with her ven-
dors and clients.
Mr. Miller began bringing pornographic magazines and movies to the 
workplace, charging a dollar for admission to the conference room at lunch 
where he would show the movies. He showed Ms. Baker pictures of por-
nography depicting bestiality. She utilized the new HR policies and com-
plained to her manager, documenting multiple complaints. There were 
other women in the department, but the ethic was one of gendered tough-
ness and, while they would express frustration privately to Ms. Baker, they 
did not make formal complaints. Finally, she told us:
There were two final straws. One of them was when he [had] a porno-
graphic picture of a woman who had a watermelon shoved into her vagi-
na. And [the woman in the photograph] was on a bed and had stiletto 
heels on . . . . Daniel took it in front of a group of my peers and said, 
“Oh, look Kristen, we would recognize you anywhere with those heels 
on.” I was humiliated, just humiliated and then reported it.
Shortly thereafter, in front of a client:
Daniel went in a room and pulled out this tray of chocolate dildos and 
took out one, a big one, and stuck it in my face, in my mouth, and said, 
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“Here I know you like to suck on these. Suck on this.” And I just [said], 
“I can’t do this anymore.”
Ms. Baker took all of the appropriate steps to stop the discrimination, 
making repeated reports to the appropriate workplace representatives, but 
nothing happened. After the chocolate dildo incident, she told us that she 
told her boss:
“Look, if this does not stop, if some action is not taken, I will file a law-
suit.” What wound up happening is that I just kept threatening and 
threatening and threatening . . . . I said, “You know, I keep talking to you 
about what is going on, he is now the vice president, nothing has 
changed, and I am going to talk to an attorney.” I really wasn’t going to 
at that time. I just wanted him to stop so that I could just do my job with-
out having to be nervous about staying late, about being there alone with 
him because he was a sexual pervert.
When she eventually spoke to an attorney at the urging of a friend, her 
attorney told her (and later, us) “you know, I don’t normally take non-
corporate clients . . . [but] I have to take this case, because you really were 
treated inhumanely.”
Ms. Baker said her attorney informed her “that it wasn’t a million dol-
lar case.” This was not important to her, she told us: “It was never about 
money, so we [demanded] a simple [settlement] of just $100,000 . . . and 
then an apology.” And she wanted to keep her job because it provided her 
family’s health insurance (her husband had a chronic illness that required 
ongoing medical attention).
As the case proceeded, Mr. Miller eventually was forced to give a 
deposition in which he denied the most outrageous accusations and sugar-
coated others. Shortly after his deposition, the company’s owner asked a 
respected former employee, Tim Fligstein, what he saw when he worked 
with Mr. Miller and Ms. Baker. With nothing to lose now that he worked 
for another company, Mr. Fligstein answered honestly. In Ms. Baker’s 
words, he told the owner what happened “word for word.” Ms. Baker cried 
as she told us, “[t]hat is when they decided to drop the suit because they 
knew that they were wrong.” After the owner heard the truth from someone 
he apparently valued (a man), GCo decided to settle the lawsuit.
The company’s first offer was separation, $10,000 for Ms. Baker’s at-
torney’s fees, and a confidentiality clause. She would not receive health 
insurance, and she was bothered that the settlement “would have to go 
down in [sic] record that I lost the lawsuit and I said, ‘No. I can’t do that.’” 
After a month of negotiations, she would have settled for a public apology, 
one dollar, and to keep her job. GCo wanted a private apology, some cash 
settlement, and for Ms. Baker to leave the company. She recounted her 
feelings:
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I am not leaving the company. I didn’t do anything wrong. If I leave at 
this point, then I am the guilty party because then it looks like I just 
wanted it for the money . . . . And it had absolutely not one thing to do 
with the money. It had to do with my integrity and who I am.
Ms. Baker dropped the lawsuit, keeping her job and benefits in ex-
change for the following concessions: apologies from Mr. Miller, as well as 
from the past and current presidents of GCo in front of all of GCo’s execu-
tive management; one dollar (that was not recorded in any settlement doc-
uments); a stipulation that the case would neither be characterized as a 
“loss” for Ms. Baker nor could GCo’s owner ever claim that he “always 
won lawsuits”; that Mr. Miller could never advance in management; and 
that the company start a sexual harassment program that month. Ms. Baker 
enjoyed a seventeen- year career at GCo after the lawsuit. Mr. Miller even-
tually was fired or quit (no one we interviewed was exactly sure which).
In what follows of this section, we analyze each element of a dignity 
taking in turn, returning to Ms. Baker, Mr. Handley (from the beginning of 
the Article), and other plaintiffs we interviewed to illustrate how employ-
ment discrimination and the litigation system itself constitute a case of 
dignity taking.
A. Does Employment Discrimination and the Process of Pursuing the 
Legal Claim Amount to a Deprivation of Property for the Individual?
For an individual to suffer a dignity “taking,” that individual must suf-
fer some kind of material loss. Atuahene uses the loss of real property in 
South Africa. And yet, the material loss can also function as anticipated, 
earned future material goods, such as in this case with wages or salary. 
Consider Kristin Baker, above. She makes the case clearly when she told us 
that that the sexualized teasing was ruining her credibility with her vendors 
and clients. In a commission-driven industry, this has a direct impact on her 
compensation alongside the psychic toll of being harassed daily. Moreover, 
her husband’s chronic medical condition, and her family’s reliance on 
healthcare provided by GCo meant she was in a somewhat quid-pro-quo 
harassment arrangement. In exchange for continued employment (and the 
health insurance that came along with it), she was required to tolerate sexu-
al harassment.
In some ways, this element of the dignity takings test is the easiest to 
show in the case of employment discrimination. The material loss here is 
obvious because a devalued worker also will be underpaid and under-
promoted. When an employee is terminated (a very common outcome in 
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cases like this), the loss is absolute—the loss of all income, health insur-
ance (where applicable), other benefits, et cetera.
And yet, this element is also complicated because the taking has to be 
done by the state. For those employees working for local, state, and federal 
employers (some 15% of the workforce in 2016), discrimination itself 
meets this condition. But how do we understand employees in private or-
ganizations that are discriminated against? Can it be said that the state is 
involved in the taking when MegaCorp engages in or permits discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability?
We think so. The endowment of a statutory right to a discrimination-
free workplace imbues employers with state-sanctioned power and respon-
sibility. Although, for private employers, it may not be the state itself act-
ing to dehumanize (though that certainly happens in the regulatory and 
litigation processes), the state is legitimizing behavior of private actors. 
And then lawyers and judges, as officers of the legal system, dehumanize 
these individuals through the cases.
B. Does the Discrimination Itself and the Subsequent Legal Process 
Infantilize or Dehumanize the Party Claiming Discrimination?
Matthew Brown’s employment civil rights dispute in the workplace 
began after a promotion. An African-American retail account manager in 
his forties, Mr. Brown (“P9”) faced increased hostility from his new super-
visors, all of whom were white men. The position normally required an 
undergraduate degree, but Mr. Brown was given the job before he finished 
his degree, which he was completing at night. Rumors began to circulate 
that Mr. Brown had been promoted on the basis of his racial status, rather 
than his qualifications, and he began to have frequent conflicts with his 
new manager, who aggressively criticized his work. When Mr. Brown 
would seek a second opinion to confirm that he was in fact performing his 
duties and producing good work, the manager would respond with insults 
and, in one instance, by throwing things.
These tantrums stopped after Mr. Brown took the issue to the HR of-
fice; the manager resigned shortly thereafter. After a second manager quit, 
coworkers began to accuse Mr. Brown of pushing talented people out of the 
company and of being insulated from disciplinary action or termination. 
These employees felt that the threat of a race discrimination lawsuit was 
“forcing” the company to allow Mr. Brown’s continued employment. Alt-
hough he saw the increasingly “racialized” nature of these accusations, Mr. 
Brown felt reluctant to, in his words, “play the race card,” since the mes-
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sages being sent to him were, “‘How dare you?! You’re African American. 
You’ve been given an opportunity. You should play ball.’”
Consider Matthew Brown’s workplace situation along with Gerry 
Handley’s from the beginning of this Article. Both were the only African-
American worker in their immediate department, and both were subject to 
racial stereotypes about African Americans: in Mr. Brown’s case, that he 
only received and kept his job as part of illegitimate affirmative action 
programs designed to promote unqualified African-American employees; 
in Mr. Handley’s case, that African-American men are lascivious, over-
sexed perpetrators of incest. The stereotypes that confronted Mr. Brown 
clearly demonstrate how some workers are devalued on the basis of skin 
color. Mr. Handley’s are an example of the worst kind of dehumanization: 
physical violence; in addition to the disregard for his work, Mr. Brown’s 
manager threw things at him!
C. Do Aggrieved Parties Seek Some Recognition of the Loss of This 
Humanity?
Annie Daley (“P18”), a forty-year-old African-American supervisor, 
filed a race discrimination claim against her employer, a telecommunica-
tions firm. Her director, a white woman, had accused Ms. Daley of hiring 
too many African Americans. Then, the employees under Ms. Daley’s 
charge began performing at a subpar level and expressed open racial hostil-
ity. Ms. Daley told us “there was one particular supervisor who, who made 
it very clear that she was not going to report to a black woman . . . . She 
even called me a black ‘B’ [bitch].”
Soon after Ms. Daley looked to her own supervisor and the HR de-
partment for assistance in disciplining these white employees, she was 
fired. While Ms. Daley’s attorney, Ellis Barry, a white man, praised her 
character and noted “a pattern of somebody who clearly was not in favor, 
not in management’s favor or never had been,” her employer’s attorney, a 
white woman, Mary Hill, described Ms. Daley exactly as Ms. Daley antici-
pated. Ms. Hill told us “she came across as not terribly sharp and really 
kind of cold . . . . Not someone you would warm up to and feel sympathy 
for. She came across as rigid and sort of bitchy.”
Ms. Daley refused a last-minute settlement offer of $100,000, and the 
case went to trial. The jury, which was comprised largely of white people, 
and included several older white males, decided in favor of the telecommu-
nications company—neglecting the problematic characterization of her as 
bitchy.
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Ms. Daley’s story is certainly one of dehumanization by stereotype. 
The pervasive stereotype that African-American women are bitchy or over-
bearing matriarchs originate in African-American slavery. Stereotypes of 
the feminine as delicate, good, and modest were limited to white women, 
while black womanhood signified masculinized strength and hard labor in 
combination with attributes of promiscuity.28 In modern America, the ma-
triarchy stereotype also roots itself in the reality of high unemployment 
among African-American men and the imperative that African-American 
women fulfill the breadwinner role (in turn, this economic reality clearly 
contributes to the stereotype of male laziness).29 The stereotype of the “an-
gry African American woman” caricatures African-American women as 
possessive, nagging, and always irate. The stereotype has structural origins 
in the “shortage” of available African-American men through incarceration, 
homicide, and unemployment throughout the United States.
In retrospect, Ms. Daley assessed her case in terms of the difficulty of 
achieving justice and the challenges of confronting racism at work: “You 
can try to prevent people from, you know, from mistreating peo-
ple . . . . But you can’t make them not be racist.” The legal system reassert-
ed the dignitary harm she suffered in the workplace. Despite her attempt to 
wrest it back through litigation, Ms. Daley lost. Kristin Baker, on the other 
hand, experienced her $1 and her apology as a dignity restoration.
D. Does the Litigation Process Provide a Process for Dignity Restora-
tion?
As the adversarial process comes to an end, the asymmetry of power 
between parties becomes clear. Plaintiffs often get little or nothing of mate-
rial value as a result of litigation.30 They routinely experience grave non-
material costs, such as depression. Defendant employers, while not happy 
with paying a settlement or carrying litigation costs, very seldom have to 
acknowledge that they committed discrimination. In the vast majority of 
cases, law re-inscribes ascriptive hierarchies by leaving untouched both 
those hierarchies, as well as the alleged injustices that give rise to employ-
ment civil rights litigation in the first place. Indeed, in many cases, the
28. See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1990); MELISSA V. HARRIS-PERRY, SISTER CITIZEN: SHAME, STEREOTYPES, AND BLACK 
WOMEN IN AMERICA (2011).
29. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDESS 20 (2010).
30. See BERREY, NELSON & NIELSEN, supra note 1, ch. 8.
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power of law is deployed to “seal” the outcome of a case, in that employees 
sign agreements not to disclose the terms of settlement.
Other plaintiffs accepted offers simply to end the unpleasantness of 
various aspects of litigation and the pressure from attorneys and judges. 
Catherine Harris, a middle aged white woman (“P12”), told us when her 
employer, a city government, made a “final” settlement offer, she saw it as 
a bluff, but her own attorney thought she should accept it. By her account, 
her attorney told her “‘Well, if you’re going to blow off your attorney, 
maybe you should go see another attorney.’ I said, ‘Wow!’ You know. I 
wanted a tough attorney to go after them, not me!”
Eventually, however, Ms. Harris justified her decision as one where 
the employing city government “learned their lesson,” and one in which 
she prevented her coworkers from being destroyed in the litigation process. 
She told us:
I didn’t want to tear people up like that, and I knew they’d try to tear me 
up. It was so unpleasant, it was just so unpleasant, and I think that’s in 
the end why I did take the settlement. [My] attorney really wanted me to 
take it. He put a lot of pressure on me to take it.
Gerry Handley, whose story opened this Article, told us that his law-
yer advised him to accept a $50,000 settlement, recalled: “I told him no. I 
told him no, I didn’t want to do that, but my home had went into foreclo-
sure and I was behind in my bills and stuff . . . I really got the bitter end. I 
won, but sometimes you win, you lose.” Mr. Handley did not think the 
settlement was fair, but he needed the money. And yet, plaintiffs work very 
hard to find a way to tell a story that “vindicates” their efforts.
Shelly Simmons (“P31”), a forty-five-year-old African-American fe-
male lab technician, felt affirmed when the judge in her case sympathized 
with her:
The trial vindicated me. Well, the process from where I started represent-
ing myself to the end of the trial vindicated me, as far as I was con-
cerned. [The judge] made an open apology of what happened [earlier in 
the case] . . . And believe you me, [when] I see her today, I hug her. She 
saved my life, because that really picked me up out of the dumps. It real-
ly did. It gave me motivation and courage. Interestingly, Ms. Simmons 
lost at trial and on appeal. In recounting how she rejected a significant 
settlement offer, she spoke of refusing to be silenced. “You are not going 
to shut me up for $100,000.” Despite her loss in court, the opportunity to 
express her claim at trial gave her significant satisfaction. Other plain-
tiffs derived a sense of exoneration during the depositions, when they 
told their version of the story, unencumbered, in front of their former 
employer.
For Ms. Harris, justice had not truly been achieved in her case: the or-
ganization had not changed. She described her $160,000 early settlement as 
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a “victory” but recounted many reasons for disappointment in the outcome. 
One of the most salient was that the individual bad actor was not terminat-
ed from his job. She viewed this as an affront to the principle of public 
service, and to her identity as a city employee and resident:
As someone who is very proud of a public service career, I did not feel 
comfortable with this individual being in a leadership role in a city that, 
in any city, but one that I was proud of and one that I was associated 
with and my city that I lived in. Basically, I think he was a golfing buddy 
of the city manager, and until the city manager was going to leave, he 
wasn’t going to probably leave, and all that stuff was well out of my con-
trol.
In contrast, Ms. Baker manages to create pride in her $1 settlement 
and apology. In that sense, her workplace experience was a dignity taking 
but by using the power of law for leverage, she was able to achieve a digni-
ty restoration.
The case of Rick Nolls (“P3”), a white warehouse manager in his six-
ties, is another example of abuse in workplace, but ultimate vindication 
through the law. In Mr. Nolls’ case, “vindication” took a long time and 
came in the form of an appellate court decision. Nolls was stereotyped as 
abnormal at work and, initially, in court. A sixty-four-year-old white ware-
house manager who suffered from a chemical imbalance, Mr. Nolls filed a 
disability and age discrimination suit against the large food corporation for 
which he worked. He had to take a leave associated with his illness, and 
while he was absent, someone at work started a rumor that he was on medi-
cal leave for psychological evaluation. As he recalled, coworkers said he 
was “‘in the nuthouse’” and branded him as “crazy.”
Mr. Nolls recalled that, when he was fired, he was “escorted out of the 
plant like a nut, you know, considered criminal.” This is not unusual. Em-
ployers discriminate against people with disabilities by deploying this ste-
reotype of abnormality; our other interviewees described managers who 
spread rumors, intentionally misinterpreted disability-related behaviors, 
and preyed on other employees’ misunderstandings of disabilities.31
In Mr. Nolls’ case, the employer manipulated peoples’ misunderstand-
ing of his chemical imbalance to frame him as a problem employee and as 
mentally ill, unstable, unpredictable, and possibly drug addicted. His case 
was one in which the employer turned the disability into a psychological 
stigma—thus fueling other people’s feelings of discomfort, disgust, or fear 
regarding individuals with disabilities.
31. See Berrey & Nielsen, supra note 26.
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For Mr. Nolls, “disableism” was re-inscribed in other ways at work. 
The rumors that he was mentally unstable and acting inappropriately fur-
ther undermined his authority as a supervisor. When he was fired, his em-
ployer claimed that he was no longer a credible supervisor capable of 
managing his employees. Mr. Nolls wanted to file a suit against his em-
ployer for defamation of character. He got signatures from twelve employ-
ees who affirmed that their employer had told them that Mr. Nolls was on 
leave for psychiatric reasons, when, in fact, he was on leave to better man-
age his chemical imbalance.
As this section demonstrates, litigation can sometimes provide a 
mechanism for restoration of dignity in employment civil rights cases. 
More often, however, plaintiffs leave the system feeling as though they 
lost. Where they are able to construct a win, it is often by redefining “trying 
at all” as winning, because the real “loss” would be to let the company get 
away with treatment like they suffered.
V. CONCLUSION
Dignity is at stake for everyone in the workplace. By providing em-
ployers the duty to enforce a discrimination-free workplace, the state is 
implicated in the workplace. Employment discrimination and the legal 
processes for litigating it often furthers the destruction of workers’ dignity. 
And while the process has some mechanisms for dignity restoration, they 
are relatively weak.
